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Terrorist Airline Bombings & the Article
20(1) Defense Under the Warsaw Convention:
The Lockerbie Air Disaster Reconsidered
LARRY MOORE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The terrorist bombing of an airliner, such as the much litigated
Lockerbie disaster1 several years prior, is not simply a horrible disas-
ter but a vicious international crime of epic dimensions against hun-
dreds of innocent people including many children. Instinctively, any
person, including judges and jurors, cannot but feel some sympathy for
the victims and their grieving families. These feelings can sometimes
become an influential part of any litigation on the matter against the
targeted airline.
The 1929 International Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air2 along with its modifi-
cations and additions governs monetary damages for injuries or deaths
arising out of such an international aircrash' The Warsaw Conven-
tion sharply limits the amounts that may be awarded, and as a result,
United States courts, even in minor cases, have always had a strong
hostility toward the Warsaw Convention.'
* Associate Professor of Business Law, Fogleman School of Business and Eco-
nomics, University of Memphis; J.D., Washington University; M.A., University of
Memphis; B.A., Vanderbilt University.
1. See Pagnucco v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. (In re Air Disaster at
Lockerbie Scot. on Dec. 21, 1988), 37 F.3d 804 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 934 (1995) (Lockerbie).
2. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49
U.S.C. § 40,105 (1994) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
3. See infra note 22.
4. See generally Larry Moore, Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd.: The United
States Supreme Court Eliminates the American Rule to the Warsaw Convention, 13
HASTINGS INTL & COMP. L. REV. 229 (1990) (discussing the Supreme Court's elimi-
nation, in its interpretation of the Warsaw Convention, of the American Rule, which
previously set aside the limits of the treaty if the required warning on the ticket
was set in a print size that was smaller than 10 point type) [Hereinafter Moore,
Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd.]; Larry Moore, Mental Injury and Lesion Corporelle
in International Aviation Under the Warsaw Convention: Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, 22
ACAD. LEGAL STUD. IN Bus. NAT'L PROC. 504 (1993) (analyzing the Supreme Court's
rejection of mental or psychic injury as an independent ground for recovering dam-
ages under the Warsaw Convention); Larry Moore, The Lockerbie Air Disaster: Puni-
tive Damages in International Aviation, 15 HouS. J. INT'L L. 67 (1992) (commenting
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It is, therefore, manifestly important that the airline, which is
also a victim in a terrorist tragedy, receives a full and complete hear-
ing before judgment. Otherwise, the defendant airline incurs the full
force of the anger and hostility that should be directed at the real
murderers. Upon reading the dissenting justice's opinion in Lockerbie,
it appears that such hostilities may have been transferred to the de-
fendant Pan Am at the hands of the trial judge.5
The Warsaw Convention is a multinational treaty governing all
liability in the airline industry with regards to losses or injuries to
persons, baggage, or goods resulting from a delay or an accident while
the aircraft is involved in an international flight, or while the aircraft
serves as a leg of any other international flight.6 From 1988 until the
Second Circuit's Lockerbie decision, the decisions in Warsaw Conven-
tion cases were so consistent that it appeared there would be little
excitement or interest in future cases litigated under this international
treaty.7 However, with the decision in Lockerbie and the Supreme
Court's refusal to grant certiorari,8 this view seems premature. New
questions now arise as to what latitude may be given to the United
States district courts in setting aside the damage limitations of the
Warsaw Convention and in awarding compensation beyond those of
the treaty.9 Such questions were previously considered answered. °
This article addresses the utilization and treatment of interna-
tional law in this area by the courts and the attorneys in Lockerbie.
First, this article looks at the unusual nature of this case and at its
possible effects on the settled law. If indeed this case signals a return
to the days when the United States courts tended to frequently set
aside the Warsaw Convention at will, then we are back, in terms of
law, to where we were in 1988. Second, this article examines the strat-
egy utilized in this case to determine if the defense made the best use
of international law in presenting its case.
on a Second Circuit ruling that brought the Court of Appeals into uniformity when
it held that punitive damages could not be allowed under the treaty and that the
Warsaw Convention was the sole cause of action for international air accidents)
[herinafter Moore, The Lockerbie Air Disaster]; Larry Moore, Air Disasters: Cause of
Actions in International Aviation Under the Warsaw Convention; Burying the Ghost
of Komlos, 2 SE. J. LEGAL STUD. Bus. 57 (1993) (discussing an eleventh Circuit
decision reaffirming the rule that the treaty provides the only cause of action in
international air accidents) [hereinafter Moore, Air Disasters]. See also L.
GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED: A LEGAL HANDBOOK (1988).
5. See Lockerbie, 37 F.3d at 830 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
6. Andreas Lowenfeld & Allan Mendelsohn, The U.S. and the Warsaw Conven-
tion, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 498-501 (1967).
7. Moore, The Lockerbie Air Disaster, supra note 4.
8. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Pagnucco, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995).
9. See generally Lockerbie, 37 F.3d 804.
10. Moore, The Lockerbie Air Disaster, supra note 4.
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As the global business and legal community becomes ever more a
part of our daily lives, even skilled attorneys may find that attempting
to try these cases entirely in terms of domestic practices, without the
inclusion of substantial international techniques, limits the options
and results available.
II. THE WARSAW CONVENTION
The Warsaw Convention is one of the world's oldest general inter-
national treaties and exclusively governs international commercial air
travel. It was enacted in 1929 to protect the new aviation industry
from the disastrously large judgments possible in air accidents at the
time." It also provided uniformity among countries as to the content
of tickets, baggage claim checks, and airbills. 2 The information, found
on the standard international traveler's airline ticket, is required by
this treaty."3
Since its enactment, the treaty has been changed by a number of
conferences and meetings." To the United States, most of these con-
ferences amounted to little,5 having accepted only one modification
from them. 6 Even that modification was not an official one, rather it
was an indirect change resulting from an agreement reached in Mon-
treal by major commercial airlines agreeing to both strict liability and
to an increase in liability limits to $75,000.00 in international acci-
dents." This agreement was at the time enforced by the Civil Aero-
nautic Board, now the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).' 8
The original Warsaw Convention was the result of two interna-
tional conferences whose purposes were to draft a law aiding the devel-
opment of the fledgling airline industry. 9 The idea came from a pro-
posal by the French called the Avant-Project, which proposed to fix
liability and provide for uniformity in the regulation of international
aviation." This proposal was submitted to the 1925 Paris Conference
on Private International Air Law, the first of two conferences held for
11. Larry Moore & Stephen P. Ferris, Air Disasters And Their Financial Effects
On The International Aviation Industry: Justification For The Warsaw Convention? 4
J. LEGAL STUD. IN Bus. 107, 107 (1995).
12. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 498.
13. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 3.
14. See GEORGETrE MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 37-38
(1977).
15. See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 549-50 (1991).
16. MILLER, supra note 14, at 37.
17. Agreement Relating to the Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention
and the Hague Protocol, May 16, 1966, CAB 18,900, approved by Order E-23680, 31
Fed. Reg. 7302, reprinted in note following 49 U.S.C. § 40,105 (1994) at 1147-48
[hereinafter Montreal Agreement].
18. Id.
19. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 498.
20. MILLER, supra note 14, at 12-13.
1996
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
this purpose.2 1 The first draft of the Warsaw Treaty came out of this
1925 Conference.22 A commission was formed and a panel of experts
was appointed to study the problems of aviation and to present pro-
posed solutions to an international convention, specifically called on to
ratify these proposals.23 The commission was called the Comite Inter-
national Technique d'Experts Juridiques Aeriens.' It considered this
problem over a four year period and made its final report to the second
conference held in Warsaw, Poland, in 1929.26 There, the treaty was
ratified by the member nations in October, 1929,2 and went into ef-
fect on February 13, 1933.27
The League of Nations and an additional 44 countries were invit-
ed to attend the 1929 Conference. 28 Thirty-two nations officially at-
tended this conference, along with the representatives of the League of
Nations and the International Commission of Air Navigation. 29 The
United States sent a representative, but did not make a formal appear-
ance as a participant and was listed as an unofficial attendant." The
United States became a formal signatory to the treaty in 1934.1
The United States never accepted the treaty because of its low
liability limit in cases of personal injury or death. 2 Under Article
22(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the total damages allowed was
125,000 Poincare francs33 or approximately $8,300.' The United
States eliminated even the opportunity for inflation adjustments when
it froze the value of gold. The United States later abandoned the gold
standard altogether.35 As a result of this abandonment of the gold
21. Id. at 12.
22. SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL LAw, MIN-
UTES, October 4-12, 1929, Warsaw, 11-12 (Robert Homer & Didier Legrez trans., 2d
ed. 1975) [hereinafter MINUTES].
23. G. Nathan Calkins, Jr., The Cause of Action Under The Warsaw Convention,
26 J. AIR L. & COM. 217, 220, 227 (1959). See also MINUTES, supra note 22, at 17-
18.
24. Calkins, supra note 23, at 218 n.7.
25. Id. at 227.
26. Id. at 236.
27. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 501.
28. MINUTES, supra note 22, at 3.
29. Barbara J. Buono, The Recoverability of Punitive Damages Under the Warsaw
Convention in Cases of Willful Misconduct: Is the Sky the Limit?, 13 FORDHAM INTL
L.J. 570, 575 (1990).
30. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 502.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 504-05.
33. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 22.
34. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 49.
35. Rene Mankiewicz, The Judicial Diversification of Uniform Private Law War-
saw Conventions, 21 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 718, 719 (1972). Warsaw Convention article
22(4) states that the 125,000 francs "mentioned above shall be deemed to refer to
the French franc consisting of 65 1/2 milligrams of gold at the standard of fineness
of nine hundred thousandths. These sums may be converted into any national cur-
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standard, the damage limits have been frozen at the last official U.S.
gold to dollar exchange rate set by the Civil Aeronautics Board in
1958.8 Because of the low amount of recovery with no adjustments
for inflation, the United States courts have sought ways to avoid the
limits of this Warsaw Convention. 7
Due to the displeasure of the United States, the other member
nations sought a compromise and called a number of later conferences
and meetings to find an agreeable solution.8 Few of these meetings
led to any major changes.89 The most important modifications were
the Hague Protocol,' the Montreal Agreement,41 the Guatemala City
Protocol, 2 and the Guadalajara Warsaw Convention. 3
None of these treaties, however, satisfied the United States, and
none were ever ratified by Congress." Only the Montreal Agreement
has became a part of American law.' Criticism of the treaty and its
limit on damage awards was always severe in the United States"6 and
reached its climax in Ross v. Pan American Airways.7 The protest
caused by this case led other nations, who were parties to the treaty,
to seek a compromise to the treaty amount without offending other na-
tions."
rency in round figures." Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 22.
36. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 446 U.S. 243, 243 (1984).
37. Moore, Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., supra note 4.
38. MILLER, supra note 14, at 37-38.
39. Id. at 38, 258.
40. Protocol to Amend the Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, opened for signature at Warsaw on
Oct. 12, 1929, done at the Hague, Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter the
Hague Protocol]. This agreement, ratified by the other member nations in 1955, was
so unpopular in the United States that it was not submitted to the Senate for con-
firmation until 1961. Though the entire purpose of the Hague Warsaw Convention
was to appease the United States, its decision to raise the maximum damage award
to only $16,000 was still too low for the United States. The Hague Protocol was still
the subject of bitter debate until 1966 when the Montreal Agreement was placed
into effect. It was never formally ratified in this country. MILLER, supra note 14, at
498-501.
41. Montreal Agreement, supra note 17. See also MILLER, supra note 14, at 37.
42. MILLER, supra note 14, at 37-38. This 1971 Protocol raised the limits for
damages for nations signing it to $100,000. However, this was one of a number of
later modifications to the Warsaw Convention that the United States did not sign.
Moore & Ferris, supra note 11, at 110 n.27.
43. MILLER, supra note 14, at 38, 258. "This Protocol sought to solve the prob-
lems which arose when the contracting carrier used a third party carrier for some
part of the international flight." Moore & Ferris, supra note 11, at 110 n.28.
44. Moore & Ferris, supra note 11, at 110.
45. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 595-96.
46. Id. at 502-04.
47. Ross v. Pan Am. Airways, 85 N.E.2d 880 (N.Y. 1949). See also Moore & Fer-
ris, supra note 11, at 110.
48. Moore & Ferris, supra note 11, at 110.
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The result was the 1955 Hague Protocol, which raised the treaty
limits to 250,000 Poincare francs or approximately $16,600."9 The
United States rejected this compromise because it was still lower than
the $25,000 increase, recommended by the United States at the
time.50 Congress never ratified the Hague Protocol though it was de-
bated within the Office of the President and within Congress for ten
years. 1 In 1965, those opposing the treaty prevailed and the United
States officially filed a Notice of Denunciation of the treaty which was
the first step in withdrawing from the Treaty.52 This led to further
negotiations among the member nations and among the airlines in an
attempt to keep the United States under the Warsaw Convention."
In a special meeting of the major air carriers of the member na-
tions held in Montreal, Canada, in February of 1966, the private
agreement that is still in effect today was reached.5 This agreement
mollified, but did not eliminate criticism of the Warsaw Convention
within the United States as evidenced through its courts, which over
the years allowed numerous exceptions to the limitations of the War-
saw Convention.5
However, beginning in 1989 with Chan v. Korean Air Lines,
Ltd., the United States Supreme Court and appellate courts have
issued a series of rulings sharply limiting the ability of lower courts to
look for rights and remedies outside the Warsaw Convention in ad-
judicating cases that arise under it.57
III. THE LOCKERBIE CASE
One means by which a court may still circumvent the limits es-
tablished by the Warsaw Convention is to find that the injury was
caused by willful misconduct of the defendants as set forth in article
25(1) of the treaty." A number of cases have been tried upon this is-
49. Id.
50. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 506.
51. Moore & Ferris, supra note 11, at 111.
52. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 551. The United States was fully
prepared to denounce the treaty unless the limits of liability were raised to at least
$100,000. See Notice of Denunciation, 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. at 924-25 (1965).
53. Moore & Ferris, supra note 11, at 111.
54. Id.
55. Id. See also Moore, The Lockerbie Air Disaster, supra note 4.
56. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 109 S. Ct. 1676 (1989).
57. Moore, Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., supra note 4.
58. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 25. Article 25 (1) states:
[tihe carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of
this convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is
caused by his wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in
accordance with the law of the court to which the case is submitted, is
considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct.
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sue59 and it has been a major issue in several others.' Lockerbie is
such an Article 25(1) case. The manner in which it was conducted at
the trial level resulted in the defendants getting what can at best be
described as "minimal" due process and represents the attitude that
many U.S. judges have exhibited toward the Warsaw Convention since
its inception and represents the hazards to any defendant who does
not fully understand or utilize the treaty.6 '
The known facts, as based upon all of the evidence as summarized
in a straightforward analysis by the Court of Appeal's dissenting opin-
ion, follow.62 On December 21, 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 from London
to New York exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland.' There was no hard
evidence to prove when, where, or how the bomb was placed on the
airplane.6 No one knows if the bomb was placed on an unmatched
piece of luggage, 5 that is a bag placed on board the plane but not ac-
companying any passenger," or if it was brought aboard by some un-
witting pawn. 7 How the bomb got on board was a matter of contro-
versy and its proof was a highly contested issue among experts.6
However, this was not the picture that the jury was allowed to see.69
A. Trial Issues
The Plaintiffs in this case proceeded under Article 25(1) of the
Warsaw Convention. ° This means that if the plaintiffs proved that
the defendants were guilty of willful misconduct, the defendants could
not then avail themselves of the liability limits of Article 22(1) of the
59. See Rowe v. Gatke, 126 F.2d 61 (7th Cir 1942); American Airlines, Inc. v.
Ulen, 186 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Pekelis v. Transcontinental and W. Air, Inc.,
187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1951); Grey v. American Airlines, Inc., 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir.
1955); Koninklike Luchtvaart Maatschappij v. Tuller, 292 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1961);
Leroy v. Sabena Belg. World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1965); Berner v. British
Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965); Goepp v. American
Overseas Airlines, 117 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1952); Froman v. Pan Am. Airways, 135
N.Y.S.2d 619 (1954).
60. See Hill v. United Airlines, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 1048 (D. Kan. 1982); Republic
Nat'l Bank v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 815 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1987); Floyd v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462 (11 Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 530
(1991); Harpalani v. Air India, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 797 (N.D. Ill. 1986); In re Air
Crash Disaster at Gander, 684 F. Supp. 927 (W.D. Kan. 1987).
61. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 499.
62. Pagnucco v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. (In re Air Disaster at
Lockerbie Scot. on Dec. 21, 1988), 37 F.3d 804, 830-37 (2nd Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 934(1995) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 811.
64. Id. at 834 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 819.
67. Id. at 834 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 811.
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treaty" and thus become subject to unlimited liability under Article
25(1)." 2 Under the Warsaw Convention, willful misconduct means that
a carrier must have acted either 1) with knowledge that its actions
would probably result in injury or death7" or 2) in a conscious or reck-
less disregard of the fact that death or injury would be the probable
consequences of its actions.7 Under this definition, the Warsaw
Convention's concept of willful misconduct involves an act or acts that
are a flagrant violation of a duty intended to protect passengers, lug-
gage, and cargo.7" Thus, willful misconduct goes beyond the United
States' common law concept of ordinary negligence and raises it to a
level of fault that makes it more akin to our concept of gross negli-
gence or reckless disregard of safety.7"
Further, if there is no willful misconduct in the law of a particular
nation in which a Warsaw Convention case is being tried, that case
must be tried under whatever principles exist in that nation's legal
system that is the equivalent of willful misconduct under the Warsaw
Convention.77 Note that this means that Article 25(1) is not to be read
in such a manner as to allow the individual nation to determine if the
act or actions in question would be considered willful misconduct by lo-
cal standards. In other words, though Article 25(1) refers to local cus-
toms, because of its insistence on equivalence, it is obvious that there
is the intent to establish a uniform international standard."
If a plaintiff is successful in proving that the defendant was guilty
of willful misconduct, this removes the limitations on damages estab-
lished in Article 17 regarding amounts that may be awarded for injury
or death.79 This is not a blanket waiver of damage limitations
71. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 22. See supra note 33 and accompa-
nying text.
72. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 25. For text of article 25(1), see supra
note 58.
73. Lockerbie, 37 F.3d at 812; See also Juan Acosta, Willful Misconduct under
the Warsaw Convention: Recent Trends and Developments, 19 U. MIAMI L. R. 575,
575 (1965).
74. Lockerbie, 37 F.3d at 812; see also Acosta, supra note 73, at 575.
75. Acosta, supra note 73, at 589.
76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Sec. 500 (1977).
An actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he
does an act or intentionally fails to do an act that was his duty to the
other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts that would lead
a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unrea-
sonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is
substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct
negligent.
Id.
77. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 25. For the text of article 25(1), see
supra note 58.
78. Id.
79. Warsaw convention, supra note 2, art. 17. Article 17 states that:
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though." The defendant does not become liable for all manner of
damages resulting from the accident, that is, it does not expand the
types of damages beyond those allowed under Article 17.81 It merely
removes the dollar limit for Article 17 damages which only allow dam-
ages for personal injury."2 The damage limit is determined in gold
francs, because the United States was subject to the gold standard
until 19 5 8 .' Additionally, the damages are subject, in this country, to
the modification of the 1965 Montreal Agreement which raised the
award limitation to $75,000.00.84
B. Judicial Proceedings
At trial, the plaintiffs proceeded to show that the defendants'
security measures were so defective, specifically in its failure to comply
with FAA regulations concerning unaccompanied baggage, as to
amount to willful misconduct under Article 25(1)." The defense coun-
tered with a straightforward denial of misconduct and proceeded to
attempt to offer proof in support of this position." However, in relying
solely on Article 25(1), the defendants unintentionally damaged both
their case on appeal and their successful application to the Supreme
Court to grant certiorari. To help fully understand what happened in
this case, it may be best to summarize what was proven at the trial
based upon all the facts gleaned from both the majority and dissenting
opinion.
The plaintiffs' position was that the defendants' baggage handling
procedure violated accepted FAA procedure and that there was no oral
waiver from the agency of this procedure.87 Because of this defective
procedure, a terrorist was able to hide a bomb, disguised as a Toshiba
radio, in a suitcase8 that was then placed on an airplane in Malta,
Spain.89 This luggage was then transferred to the targeted Pan Am
[tihe carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by
a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took
place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking.
Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 446 U.S. 243, 243 (1984).
84. Moore & Ferris, supra note 11, at 112.
85. Pagnucco v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. (In re Air Disaster at
Lockerbie Scot. on Dec. 21, 1988), 37 F.3d 804, 811 (2nd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 934 (1995).
86. Id. at 812.
87. Id. at 813-17.
88. Id. at 811.
89. Id.
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flight in Frankfurt, Germany. ° The bag was x-rayed, but not
physically examined, at the Frankfurt airport in violation of FAA regu-
lations." The plane stopped in London before taking off for the Unit-
ed States.2 Over Lockerbie, Scotland, the bomb exploded, killing all
aboard. Further, the defendants ignored repeated warnings, even to
the point of hiding warnings from the crew and passengers. 4
The plaintiffs' proof, as well as that offered by the defendants,
was to be derived primarily through the testimony of expert witness-
es. 5 This was because causation, the most important issue in this
case, could not proven by any direct evidence and had to be developed
by the testimony of experts." At trial, as a result of the trial judge's
rulings on a series of plaintiffs' objections, almost all of the defendants'
experts, and therefore, their case was excluded from the jury. The
jury thus heard only the plaintiffs' side of the case and returned a
verdict against the defendants.98 An award of damages was granted
to the estate of three victims as a test case for appeal on certain ques-
tions concerning damages under the treaty." The damage award is-
sue was whether the awards went beyond the provisions of the War-
saw Convention both as to the amount under Article 22 and as to the
type under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention."° The damage
award for the remaining plaintiffs was to await the appellate decision
on these issues.'
On appeal, the majority for the Court of Appeals, obviously, had a
great deal of trouble in both deciding and in explaining its position in
this case."° The initial decision was found unsatisfactory and a new
decision issued." Conceptually, the opinion decided two classes of
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 820.
95. Id. at 811.
96. Id. at 824-25.
97. Id. at 824-25. The dissenting judge, believed that:
[tihe district judge treated this case as if Pan Am were being prosecut-
ed for criminally violating a federal statute and, relying on his errone-
ous interpretation of criminal law, precluded every attempt by Pan Am
to demonstrate that it did not know or believe that the probable result
of its conduct would be injury to the plaintiffs.
Id. at 841 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 811. "At the conclusion of the damages phase $9,225,000 was awarded
to the Pagnucco family, $9,000,000 to the Bainbridge family, and $1,735,000 to the
Porter family." Id.
99. Id. at 810.
100. Id. at 811.
101. Id. at 810.
102. Id. at 810 n.1.
103. Id.
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issues. The main issue concerned the admissibility of evidence. T10 The
other issue regarded the nature of the damages that may be permit-
ted. O
It was the issue regarding the admissibility of evidence that
caused the difficulties for the Court of Appeals. In analyzing the ques-
tion of evidence, the court looked at a series of issues and rulings on
testimony. First, it ruled that the lower court's rejection of the
defendants' evidence, which the defendants claimed showed its state of
mind, was not enough to warrant a new trial since the trial court de-
cided that the defendant had received numerous warnings and ignored
them."8
Although the court found there was error in rejecting the evidence
of the defendants, showing that their security procedures were the
same as those required by British security regulations, the court deter-
mined this was harmless error, as the defendants were able to place
some evidence before the jury in other parts of the trial showing the
effectiveness of their x-ray system."°7 The court also held that the tri-
al court's exclusion of the defendants' expert to counter the testimony
of the plaintiffs' expert, as to the security risk of unaccompanied lug-
gage, was corrected by the trial court's curative instruction to the ju-
ry.
108
While the trial court's acceptance of the plaintiffs' presentation of
unrelated security issues was found to be prejudicial, this was consid-
ered proper because it showed causation."°8 The court further held
that there was no error in barring the defendants' expert witnesses as
to causation and in limiting the defendants' cross-examination of the
plaintiffs' witness.1 10 The court also found it was harmless error to
have allowed the plaintiffs' expert to conclude that the defendants
were in violation of the FAA regulation."' Finally, the court conclud-
ed that the defendants were not harmed by being denied the right to
demonstrate the effectiveness of their x-ray because the plaintiffs stip-
ulated as to its operation. 2
Regarding the question of damages, the jury not only awarded
damages for wrongful death, it also allowed damages for loss of society
and companionship. 13 The court looked at the damages permitted
104. Id. at 811.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 819.
107. Id. at 821.
108. Id. at 822.
109. Id. at 824.
110. Id. at 825.
111. Id. at 827:
112. Id. at 828.
113. Id. at 830 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
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under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention and held that losses had to
be limited to those allowed under the treaty."4 It ruled that the loss
of companionship and society would not be allowed to adult children of
victims and reversed the trial court on this issue.115
In the defendants' petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court, the only issues left for consideration, though critical to the
defendants' case, were questions regarding the admissibility of evi-
dence in areas where the law was well established.11 The Supreme
Court has maintained a practice in Warsaw Convention cases in recent
years of only taking those cases in which there is either some new
questions about the treaty, or where the court had to correct an im-
proper use or interpretation of the treaty in the lower courts."7 With
nothing to consider here but a relatively mundane question of admissi-
bility of evidence, it is not surprising that certiorari was denied in this
case.
C. Article 20(1) As A Defense Tool In Warsaw Convention Cases
As one reads through the Circuit Court of Appeal's summary of
the defendants' actions in this case as laid out by the plaintiffs, one
can easily become embittered towards the defendants. It is only after
reading the dissenting opinion, which painstakingly laid out the ele-
ments of the defendants' case that was kept from the jury, does the
case come back into perspective and allows one to see that the defen-
dants had a legitimate and reasonable defense to the charge of willful
misconduct. If hearing only one side of the case can enrage this author,
who is an expert in Warsaw Convention cases, the subsequent verdict
from a jury is not surprising. The Court of Appeals decision that the
evidentiary rulings were harmless error is not persuasive.
The defendants cannot be faulted for the strategy used in this
case. Because they had a fairly good defense, they decided to meet the
plaintiffs' allegations head on, challenging the plaintiffs' facts with
their facts, and the plaintiffs' experts with their own." 8 The defen-
dants could not have reasonably anticipated that the trial judge would
allow all of the plaintiffs' proof and bar almost all of the defendants'
proof to the jury."' The trial judge treated this case as if it were a
criminal case where the defendants knowingly broke the law, instead
of as a civil suit where the issue was whether the defendants did all
114. Id. at 829-30.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 838-39.
117. Moore, Air Disasters, supra note 4.
118. Pagnucco v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. (In re Air Disaster at
Lockerbie Scot. on Dec. 21, 1988), 37 F.3d 804, 834 (2nd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 934 (1995) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 845-46.
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that they could do to carry out the goals of an administrative regula-
tion.12 °
In retrospect, had the defendants utilized Article 20(1) of the
convention121 in framing their defense, it would have enhanced the
ability to get their case before the jury, or in getting the Supreme
Court to grant an appeal for the following reasons.
Article 20(1), among other things, absolves the defendant from
liability if the defendant proves that it and its agents had taken all
necessary measures to avoid the damage that has been caused." The
language of Article 20(1) places an affirmative duty on the defendant
to prove that it took reasonable and necessary steps to prevent the
accident."= Thus, if the defendant proceeds under this section, its
actions become a jury question where the evidence is evaluated to
determine if the defendant's actions satisfied the language of Article
20(1). Most importantly, the trial judge would not be in a position to
exclude the defendant's evidence, as was done so easily and completely
in this case, where evidence was offered only in opposition to the
plaintiffs' proof presented under Article 25(1). In other words, since the
burden of proof falls upon the defendant, under Article 20(1) it be-
comes more difficult for the court to exclude evidence on grounds that
it is immaterial, or reduce it to a cautionary warning to the jury, with-
out placing such rulings in jeopardy of being reversed as prejudicial er-
ror. More importantly, however, it allows the defendant to raise an
issue under the Warsaw Convention for appeal purposes. In the past,
appeals on these grounds have received far greater attention by the
Supreme Court than other types of issues, such as questions of evi-
dence as in this case.' 2'
Using Article 20(1), the defendants could have then called their
experts and through their testimony presented critical evidence. For
instance, no one knew who placed the bomb on the airplane." Next,
any theories of how the bomb got on board were just that, theories of
the testifying experts. 26 The questions of whether the bomb was in a
Toshiba radio in an unaccompanied bag or whether it was carried on
120. Id. at 841 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
121. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 20. Article 20(1) states that "the car-
rier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary
measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take
such measures." Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Moore, Air Disasters, supra note 4.
125. Pagnucco v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. (In re Air Disaster at
Lockerbie Scot. on Dec. 21, 1988), 37 F.3d 804, 834 (2nd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 934 (1995) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
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board by an unsuspecting passenger was all a matter of complete spec-
ulation."
Another argument is that the company had asked for and believed
it had obtained an interpretation of the FAA airport security regula-
tions which allowed x-ray inspection as an acceptable alternate to
physical examination, a request it was allowed to make.'28 The de-
fendants could have also shown that they had numerous FAA inspec-
tions at the Frankfurt airport before and after the attack; that the
defendants were never cited for their use of x-rays; s that the Penta-
gon relied on x-ray scanning;.. that shortly after this disaster, the
FAA approved x-ray examination at all airports;"' that Great Brit-
ain, facing Irish Republican Army terrorism, used x-ray to guard
against terrorist bombs;3 2 that the x-ray used by the defendant was
the most expensive and effective machine on the market and was one
that would have easily shown a Toshiba radio in a suitcase;33 and
that the warning did not apply to the defendants because the defen-
dants had been told a bomb would be placed on its plane by an unsus-
pecting Flemish female passenger and, as a precaution, had increased
security looking for a person of that description.'
The defendants could have shown that it would have been highly
unlikely for a terrorist to have taken a chance on a complicated bomb-
ing scheme in which a suitcase would criss-cross a continent subject to
uncertain airline schedules, delays, and multiple take-offs and land-
ing." That would have made it impossible to guarantee that the
bomb would not go off on the ground or get misplaced altogether. 3 '
Finally, the defendants would have been allowed to show that no such
luggage as described in the defendants' case had been placed on the
airplane.1
37
The defendants would then be in a position to take evidence pre-
sented in their affirmative defense pursuant to Article 20(1) and utilize
it as a defense against the charge of willful misconduct under Article
25(1) on the grounds this proof showed a mens rea to avoid the terror-
ist attack for which they were warned. Therefore, the defendants could
not have been guilty of willfully allowing the attack.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 845.
129. Id. at 841.
130. Id. at 836 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 846.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 833.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 836 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 835.
'VOL. 25:1
TERRORIST AIRLINE BOMBINGS
IV. CONCLUSION
Even after hearing all of the defendants' proof, the jury might
possibly have returned the same verdict. However, in such a case, this
would be a verdict based upon all of the relevant facts and the defen-
dants would have received the due process rights guaranteed to them
under the constitution. Conversely, the results of the trial and appeal
in this case gave the defendant minimum due process, if any at all.
It comes as no surprise, however, that the Supreme Court did not
grant certiorari. On the crucial question of evidence, the defense did
not question either the management of the Warsaw Convention by the
United States courts or the terms of the treaty. All that remained was
whether the trial court properly ruled on the admissibility of evidence.
Indeed, though not discussed at length in this paper, the defen-
dants, at the Circuit Court level, won the only Warsaw Convention
question raised at trial.1" The Court agreed that the jury could not
award damages for certain parental losses because they were not of
the type allowed under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, as the
damages could not be applied to adult children not under their parents
supervision for purposes of the treaty."9 The Circuit Court treated
every other issue as merely a bad call by the trial judge, whose rulings
changed neither the interpretation nor the application of the treaty in
the United States. It has been these latter issues that have been the
main concern of the Supreme Court in Warsaw Convention cases."4
Because the issues on appeal did not raise any new questions of law in
evidence or under the treaty, this case would be little more than a
footnote to the history of the treaty in this country; therefore, it was of
little appellant value for the Supreme Court.
To attorneys and practitioners under this treaty or any other
international treaty, the lessons from this case are enormous. Attor-
neys must realize that when proceeding under a treaty they must
utilize all elements of the treaty and not necessarily the most obvious
sections in question. Attorneys must also be able to recognize when a
trial court is lapsing into local considerations so that the attorney can
remind the court of the cases international aspects. If this is not suc-
cessful, then the attorney must be able to draft the appeal in terms
that will bring forth the international questions, possibly hidden in the
case, so as to force a true consideration of the treaty and their case on
the merits. Otherwise, the results could be the same as in Lockerbie,
where a magnificent international legal issue was reduced to a ruling
on the admissibility of evidence.
138. Id. at 828-30.
139. Id.
140. Moore, Air Disasters, supra note 4.
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